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A “Minor” Problem with Oil and Gas Company 
Settlement Agreements 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being eight years old and sitting alongside your dad at your 
first Louisiana State University football game. The night in Tiger Stadium 
is off to a great start: the crowd is rambunctious, the weather is great, and 
the Tigers are winning. Suddenly, the night takes a turn for the worse. 
After another LSU touchdown, one of the players runs into the goalpost, 
causing it to collapse backwards into the section of seats behind the end 
zone. One of the beams comes crashing down onto you and your dad, 
causing major injuries to your legs. 
Following a lengthy lawsuit, your parents enter into a settlement 
agreement on your behalf. While the settlement provides enough money 
to cover your medical expenses and necessary care going forward, the 
settlement benefits come with a hefty price. The agreement also includes 
a confidentiality agreement—one that bars you and your family from 
discussing any aspect of LSU football for the rest of your lives. 
Football is entrenched in the culture of Southern Louisiana. It is not 
merely a sport for residents—it is a way of life. Imagine growing up and 
not being able to discuss what others talk about every day; something that 
you and your family have grown to love and accept as a major part of life. 
In May of 2011, a similar situation occurred with two children, Nathan 
and Alyson Hallowich. Nathan and Alyson were nine and five years of age 
respectively when their parents, Chris and Stephanie Hallowich, filed a 
lawsuit against oil companies for damages resulting from hydraulic 
fracturing1 (fracking) conducted near their property.2 Upon agreement to 
settle, the Hallowich parents signed a settlement agreement containing a 
non-disclosure agreement that prohibited the Hallowich family, including 
Nathan and Alyson, from discussing any of the facts, elements, or contents 
of the case for the rest of their lives.3 Essentially, the agreement served to 
Copyright 2017, by TYLER WHITE 
1. EPA, Natural Gas Extraction–Hydraulic Fracturing (Oct. 6, 2015),
water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat 
.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZRW7-J8GE] (providing a general background on hydraulic 
fracturing). 
2. Hallowich v. Range Resources Corp., No. 2010-3954, 2012 WL 7992901
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012). 
3. Id. at *2; see also Transcript of In-Chambers Proceeding Before the
Honorable Paul Pozonsky at 4, 15, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 2012 WL 7992901 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012) (No. 2010-3954), ae3b703522cf9ac6c40a-
32964bea949fe02d45161cf7095bfea9.r89.cf2.rackcdn.com/2013/211/626/pg-
se tt lement -hear ing-t ranscr ip t .pdf  [ht tps : / /perma.cc /5K6X -UX34] 
[hereinafter, Settlement Hearing Transcript]. 
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prevent not only Chris and Stephanie, but also their children, from 
discussing fracking ever again.4 
To put into perspective how dramatic this can be for someone in the 
Hallowich family’s position, it is helpful to think about the area of the 
country in which the suit took place. Before execution of the settlement, 
the Hallowich family lived on a farm located on the Marcellus Shale in 
Mount Pleasant, Pennsylvania.5 The Marcellus Shale is one of the most 
significant fracking regions in the United States. Further, fracking plays a 
large role in the area’s economy and living environment.6 Similar to 
football in Southern Louisiana, fracking is an important fixture in the 
society and culture of the Mount Pleasant, Pennsylvania region. As a result 
of the settlement, Nathan and Alyson have to live the remainder of their 
lives unable to discuss a major part of their childhood. The many 
encounters with fracking these children experienced as a result of living in 
an environment dominated by the oil industry and the resulting lawsuit 
cannot be spoken of or shared with anyone. 
This type of agreement—one where parents settle away their 
children’s ability to speak of a lawsuit in which they had no control—has 
created quite the controversy. The Hallowich case grabbed national 
attention and left many wondering how parents could be allowed to 
contract away their children’s right to freedom of speech. Many scholars 
suggest that the settlement is illegal,7 yet they are unsure as to what exactly 
makes it so. Further, while still approving the settlement, the court 
recognized the issue; addressing the counsel for the Hallowich family it 
stated: “Nor does the Court have an answer for you, and I would agree 
with counsel that I don’t know. That’s a law school question, I guess.”8 
An agreement similar to that described above is unprecedented, and 
there is no express violation of any particular law serving as grounds to 
invalidate it. Nevertheless, an agreement to bargain a child’s constitutional 
right is illegal. This Article will prove this assertion by analyzing the 
precepts from contract and constitutional law, along with those from 
public policy. Additionally, this Article will provide a solution to prevent 
the issues exemplified in Hallowich by tailoring court procedures to serve 
4. Id.
5. Suzanne Goldenberg, Children Given Lifelong Ban on Talking About
Fracking, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2013, theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/05 
/children-ban-talking-about-fracking?CMP=share_btn_link. 
6. Alex Chamberlain, Why the Marcellus Shale is Important for US Oil and
Gas, YAHOO FINANCE (Dec. 22, 2014), finance.yahoo.com/news/why-marcellus 
-shale-important-us-152716407.html [https://perma.cc/6MZK-KU9Q]. 
7. See Caitlyn Dickson, Can You Silence a Child? Inside the Hallowich Case
(Sept. 1, 2013, 3:45 AM), thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/01/can-you-silence-a 
-child-inside-the-hallowich-case.html [https://perma.cc/8LFF-7J3S]. 
8. Settlement Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 12.
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the interests of minors in settlement agreements with oil and gas 
companies. This Article will also advance the interests of oil and gas 
companies, as the proposed solution will likewise provide greater security 
for oil and gas companies in settlement agreements involving minors. 
Part I of this Article will briefly discuss fracking operations and 
settlement agreements. It will then analyze Hallowich, which illustrates 
the dilemma that this Article addresses—the constitutionality of an 
agreement executed by parents to waive their children’s fundamental 
rights. Part II will discuss both public policy and statutory law as they 
relate to parental authority to contractually bind minor children. Part III 
will review three state action cases that serve as the prelude to this 
Article’s proposed solution concerning confidentiality clauses in 
settlement agreements, particularly those in fracking cases which bind 
minor children. Part IV will propose a solution to the issue presented by 
suggesting that the state and local trial courts have more authority in the 
enforcement process of settlement agreements between private parties and 
oil and gas companies to further the interests of minors involved in such 
agreements. 
The Hallowich family is not the only one bound to a confidentiality 
agreement after agreeing to settle a civil suit with an oil and gas company.9 
Rather, there have been cases from Pennsylvania and Wyoming, as well as 
from many other regions of the country where the oil industry is prevalent.10 
I. THE DILEMMA 
The agreement reached in the Hallowich suit presents a dilemma 
regarding whether a child’s constitutional rights be contracted away. Before 
addressing this dilemma, a brief background into the importance of 
confidentiality agreements in the oil and gas arena will be given, followed by 
an analysis concerning the controversial agreement involving the Hallowich 
children. 
A. Oil and Gas Settlements and the Need for Confidentiality Agreements 
Marc Bern, a prominent New York attorney, stated that in “virtually 
all” of the settlements he has handled where the oil and gas company paid 
money to the plaintiff, the company has demanded a confidentiality 
9. Jim Efstathiou, Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with
Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG, June 5, 2013, bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-sealed-settlements [https://perma.cc 
/U9LS-TC38]. 
10. Id.
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agreement.11 Bern believes that oil and gas companies settle because they 
do not want information regarding procedures and chemicals used by the 
fracking companies to be released to the public. Thus, these companies’ 
willingness to settle is contingent upon the plaintiff’s promise not to 
disclose any information about the case or the company.12 
The majority of tort cases involving oil and gas companies result in 
settlements.13 These settlements are usually reached outside of court,14 and 
typically contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit the parties from 
discussing the contents of the settlement or details of the case.15 Plaintiffs who 
sign these agreements often promise to never disclose information about their 
injuries, the settlement provisions, or the fracking industry.16 These 
confidentiality clauses are private contractual agreements, and courts 
generally allow private parties to agree to whatever terms they wish.17 Thus, 
it is permissible for oil and gas companies to add confidentiality clauses into 
their settlement agreements if the other party so agrees.18 In fact, oil and gas 
companies consider the addition of a confidentiality clause to be an essential 
right, and often settle without having an extensive confidentiality agreement 
signed by the plaintiff.19 The plaintiff’s promise not to disclose information is 
very important to oil and gas companies because most of the companies claim 
the chemicals used in fracking operations to be trade secrets. Therefore, they 
do not want that information disclosed to the public.20 
B. The Hallowich Suit 
On May 27, 2011, Christopher and Stephanie Hallowich entered into 
a settlement agreement with Range Resources, Williams Gas/Laurel 
11. Id. Marc Bern is an attorney with Mark J. Bern & Partners LLP in New York
and has negotiated numerous fracking settlements for homeowners; see also MARK J. 
BERN & PARTNERS LLP, http://www.bernripka.com [https://perma.cc/2TH4-EV8X] 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016). 
12. Efstathiou, Jr., supra note 9.
13. Id. The Ruggieros and residents of Dimock Township agreed to settlement
agreements with oil and gas companies. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Philadelphia 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, et al. at 23, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 64 
A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (Nos. 234 WDA 2012, 235 WDA 2012), earthjustice 
.org/sites/default/files/Hallowich_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGD9-9JMG]. 
14. Efstathiou, Jr., supra note 8.
15. Id.
16. Kellie Fisher, Communities in the Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to
Shed Light on the Fracking Industry, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 99, 116–20 (2015). 
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 100.
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Mountain Midstream, and MarkWest Energy Group.21 The settlement 
arose subsequent to the Hallowich family filing suit against the oil 
companies for injury-related damages resulting from the companies’ 
hydraulic fracturing operations conducted on the property adjacent to the 
family’s farm land.22 The Hallowich family alleged that the oil and gas 
companies destroyed their farmland located on the Marcellus Shale. 
Further, they alleged that the fracking chemicals contaminated their water 
supply which caused burning eyes, headaches, and sore throats.23 
Additionally, they averred that the companies threatened the long-term 
health of their two children.24 
Similar to the resolution of most tort cases involving oil and gas 
companies, the parties agreed to settle for $750,000. Further, the 
settlement contained a confidentiality agreement prohibiting the parties 
from discussing the contents of the case. It explicitly prohibited the 
Hallowich family from speaking to anyone about the Marcellus Shale or 
hydraulic fracturing activities for the rest of their lives.25 This 
confidentiality agreement also bound the Hallowich’s minor children, who 
were ages five and nine at the time of the settlement.26 The Hallowiches 
explained to the court that they agreed to the confidentiality agreement 
because they wanted to move away from the gas fields and live in a safer 
environment for their two children.27 
It is rather unusual for a confidentiality agreement to apply to children 
like it did in the Hallowich settlement. Settlement agreements are contracts 
and thus, minors have the right to invalidate contracts to which they are 
parties.28 Furthermore, it is important to note that a confidentiality clause 
can never be legal consideration29 for an agreement to settle a minor’s 
claim. This is because the settlement of a minor’s claim requires court 
21. Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010-3954, 2012 WL 7992901 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012). 
22. Id.
23. Goldenberg, supra note 5.
24. Id.
25. Brief of Amici Curiae Philadelphia Physicians for Social Responsibility, et
al. at 23, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 64 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (Nos. 234 
WDA 2012, 235 WDA 2012), earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/Hallowich_Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77SC-R4NM]. 
26. Id. at 5.
27. Goldenberg, supra, note 5.
28. Aditi Mukherji, Does Fracking Settlement’s Gag Order Apply to Kids?,
FINDLAW (Aug. 2, 2013, 9:32 AM), blogs.findlaw.com/legally_weird/2013/08/does-
fracking-settlements-gag-order-apply-to-kids.html [https://perma.cc/VB75-HAPQ]. 
29. Consideration is the essential reason for a party entering into a contract,
and must be a benefit bargained for by both parties to the agreement. 
Consideration defined, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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approval30 and court proceedings are a matter of public record.31 As such, 
the Hallowich settlement should have been held invalid. 
II. CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS–PARENTS’ RIGHT TO CONTRACT FOR
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 
A settlement is a contract, therefore, the principles of contract law apply. 
Like any other contract, a settlement must be supported by consideration.32 
Consideration refers to “a bargained-for exchange of promises or 
performances and may consist of a promise, an act, or a forbearance.”33 
The common law of contracts suggests that the mere agreement to 
settle a dispute is enough to constitute consideration for the purpose of 
making a settlement agreement enforceable.34 However, practitioners must 
be attentive to the statutes governing consideration in the jurisdiction in 
which the contract is being executed, as some jurisdictions require specific 
elements of consideration to be met in order to make a contract enforceable 
while others do not.35 Furthermore, the contract must be entered into in 
good faith.36 Good faith bargaining is a chief concern with consideration. 
It is an element courts examine when a party to the settlement agreement 
raises the issue of lack of consideration.37 
A. Limits on Parents Binding Minors–During Minority 
Generally, minors (children) can enter into contracts.38 However, due 
to their incapacity,39 the law protects children in contracts by making the 
30. See discussion infra Part II.
31. Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
32. RICHARD A. ROSEN ET AL., SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTES § 5.06 (2016). 
33. Id. (quoting Federico v. Freedomroads RV, Inc., No. 09-CV-2027, 2010
WL 4740181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted)); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14.
39. The inability for a minor to bind themselves to a contract due to their lack of
competence. See McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.1972). 
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agreements voidable40 until the child reaches majority.41 Contract law and 
public policy indicates that parents do not have the right to contract on 
behalf of their child based merely on the parental relationship.42 Rather, 
the basis for doing so must be authorized by statute, and most states’ 
statutes that regulate settlements concerning minors mandate that the 
settlement be approved by a court in the jurisdiction where the contract 
was executed.43 This rule was designed to serve as a check on the authority 
of parents and attorneys when making decisions involving a minor’s legal 
interest. Here, the court acts as the final decision-maker to secure the 
child’s best interest.44 While in many states a parent cannot agree to a 
settlement and waive his or her child’s cause of action without prior court 
approval,45 there are other states that do not require any court approval to 
enforce contracts concerning minors.46 
Generally, courts have held that parents cannot bind a child to an 
agreement or waive their rights unless authorized to do so by statute.47 The 
common law maintains that parents cannot release a child’s cause of action 
before or after an injury occurs, nor can they bind their child to an 
agreement to arbitrate their child’s potential causes of action.48 From these 
common law standards, it is clear that parents cannot bind their child to a 
contract or waive their child’s rights absent judicial approval. For this 
reason, the Hallowiches and the defendant oil companies were required to 
obtain the Pennsylvania trial court’s approval of the settlement.49 
The law, however, does maintain an exception to the rule requiring 
court approval for the medical care of the minor—parents do have the right 
to contract for their children when it comes to the health of the child.50 A 
Florida appellate court in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc. referred 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (defining voidable contract as
a contract “where one or more parties have the power . . . to avoid the legal relations 
created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of 
avoidance.”). 
41. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 14 (stating that “[u]nless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person 
has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the 
day before the person’s eighteenth birthday.”). 
42. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265 (2016); 231 PA. CODE §
2039 (2016). 
46. Infra, Part II(D)(ii).
47. E.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Colo. 2002); Shea v.
Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
48. Cooper, 48 P. 3d 1229, 1233; Shea, 870 So. 3d 20, 23–25.
49. 231 PA. CODE § 2039 (2016)
50. Shea, 870 So. 2d at 24.
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to this as the “common sense” exception.51 The court opined that no one 
would possibly know and understand a child’s health needs better than a 
parent of that child.52 Therefore, other than to provide for the medical care 
of the child, the general rule is that parents have no right to contract or 
waive their child’s rights without obtaining prior court approval.53 
B. Limits on Parents Binding Minors Into Majority 
Ordinarily, contracts with minors are voidable once they reach 
majority.54 Thus, the child can invalidate a contract within a reasonable 
time after reaching the requisite age to be considered an adult.55 However, 
once the appropriate court has approved the settlement contract, the 
contract with the minor becomes binding.56 The child thus cannot 
invalidate the agreement once he or she becomes an adult, unless the 
hearing held to review the agreement was deemed inadequate to support 
the interest of the minor.57 In other words, if the court that reviews the 
agreement deems it to be in the best interest of the child and approves it, 
the minor cannot subsequently invalidate the settlement.58 Yet, if there is 
no court approval, the minor or his or her guardian has the right to 
renounce the agreement.59 Therefore, had the Hallowich settlement not 
been approved by the appropriate court, the Hallowich children could have 
simply invalidated the agreement upon reaching majority. Obtaining court 
approval is an important part of the settlement process, and attorneys 
representing oil and gas companies not aware of this procedure can 
potentially cause clients to lose out on settlement agreements due to the 
risk that the involved minors may later invalidate these agreements. 
This concept is illustrated in Sullivan v. Department of 
Transportation, a 1992 Florida District Court case where a woman’s 
husband and her children brought suit for damages resulting from the 
woman’s death in a car accident.60 The case settled without going to trial, 
and the settlement arrangement provided for monthly installments to be 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07.
54. Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (1980).
55. LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 10:1 (Thomas R. Young ed., 3d ed. 2015).
56. Childs By and Through Harvey v. Williams, 757 P.2d 302, 303 (Kan. 1988).
57. White v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 31 P.3d 328 (Kan. App. 2d. 2001).
58. Id.
59. Y.G. v. Riverside Unified Sch.. Dist., No. EDCV 10-1002, 2012 WL
2153957, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012); see also Pearson v. Superior Ct. of San Luis 
Obispo Cnty., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455 (2012). 
60. Tom Barber, Settling Claims Involving Minors, 69 FLA. B. J. 10, 10–19
(1995). 
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paid to the husband with a separate amount to be paid to the children.61 
Because the agreement was not approved by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, the court held that the family was able to bring a subsequent 
wrongful death action against the defendant.62 Because the defendant’s 
legal counsel did not raise the issue of court approval, the defendant was 
susceptible to being sued and at risk of paying a much higher damage 
award to the family. Thus, the interests of both the minors and the 
opposing party are better served when the attorneys for both sides seek 
court approval at the outset during settlement discussions.63 
C. The Civil Law Perspective 
In Louisiana—a state governed by the civil law of obligations—a 
settlement is referred to as a compromise.64 A compromise is “a contract 
whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle 
a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal 
relationship.”65 
While the law concerning settlements with minors in the civil law is 
similar to the common law, one minor difference exists. The civil law dictates 
that with any settlement agreement made on behalf of a minor, the court must 
both approve the compromise involving a minor and determine whether the 
terms of the proposed compromise are in the minor’s best interests.66 
This procedural rule is designed to protect the interests of minors while 
affording protection to those who contract with minors. This principle is 
relatively consistent with most common law jurisdictions. Additionally, 
Louisiana jurisprudence and the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provide 
that any agreement to waive a minor’s rights, or any contract entered into on 
a minor’s behalf without court approval, is null and without any legal effect.67 
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Trask v. Lewis, 258 So.2d 603, 605 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/31/72).
65. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (2016). There is no major difference between
a common law settlement and a civil law compromise, as the two are used 
interchangeably and the Louisiana Civil Code equates one with the other. See Trask, 
258 So.2d at 605 (stating that “[s]ettlement must be equated with compromise”). 
66. Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1009 (5th Cir. 1998); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 4265; see also discussion infra Part III. 
67. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265; see also Chambers v. Chambers, 6 So.
659 (La. 1889). Additionally, Louisiana has a special exception to its court approval 
requirement. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:196 allows for the parent of a minor to settle a claim 
or relinquish a minor’s rights without judicial approval as long as the claim is valued 
at less than $10,000. If the claim is valued at more than $10,000, then the settlement 
must be approved by the appropriate and competent court. See also, Bowen v. Smith, 
885 So. 2d 1, 3–4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/04). 
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Another difference between civil and common law regarding court 
approval is illustrated by the effect on the settlement once it has been 
nullified for lack of compliance with the Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure.68 In the common law, when the appropriate court has not approved 
the settlement, the minor can invalidate the agreement as to himself.69 While 
the agreement will no longer have any legal effect on the minor, other parties 
to the agreement may still be bound. In the civil law, however, when a contract 
is declared null by the court, it is deemed to have never existed.70 All of the 
parties to the agreement will be restored to their positions prior to the existence 
of the contract.71 If complete restoration is not possible, the parties can be 
made whole through an award of damages.72 
D. Public Policy Standards on Contracts with Minors 
The term public policy is not easily defined.73 To some, it denotes the 
common sense ideologies or principles that are applied to public state matters 
such as the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state.74 To others, 
it is the system that governs a multitude of legal issues, including those 
involving contracts.75 As public policy targeting contracts varies among 
states, examination of these different policy standards provide insight into 
why legislation that regulates contracts involving minors exist. 
The goal among the states concerning settlements involving minors is 
to protect the overall interests of the minor. However, differences exist 
among the states in regard to the regulatory procedure governing these 
settlements. One of the primary inconsistencies is the question of who is 
allowed to represent the minor at the approval hearing. The policy on this 
issue varies among states, with each state handling the issue in one of three 
ways: 1) allow the parent or legal guardian of the minor to represent the 
child; 2) allow for the minor’s attorney to stand in as the representative; or 
3) have the court appoint the representative itself. These policies can be
analyzed on a spectrum, with states favoring the appointment of 
representatives for the minor on one end, and states favoring the allowance 
of the parents or legal guardians to represent the minor on the other. Lying 
68. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265.
69. Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 555–56 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001). 
70. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 (2016); see also Bowen, 885 So. 2d at 5.
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033.
72. Id.
73. Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id.
2017] A “MINOR” PROBLEM 219 
in the middle are the states that want to preserve some parental authority 
while allowing the judiciary to oversee the settlement process. 
1. Missouri, Michigan, and Alabama
Missouri, Michigan, and Alabama are three of several states that 
represent the extreme “protective” view on the policy spectrum and favor 
the appointment of representatives for minors in settlement hearings. 
In Missouri, courts typically require that parents be judicially appointed 
to represent their own child at the settlement approval hearings.76 The 
Missouri Supreme Court held in Braughton v. Esurance Insurance Company 
that “even though a parent generally has the interests of his child at heart, ‘this 
does not mean a parent in all cases is qualified to represent his child in 
litigation.’”77 The reasoning behind the Missouri Supreme Court’s assertion 
is not entirely illogical. Missouri’s sole concern is protecting the interests of 
children involved in these settlements.78 This gives the court authority to 
determine whether the parent is qualified to represent his or her child in the 
matter.79 Thus, this policy prevents conflicts of interest and provides for a 
knowledgeable and capable representative to ensure an outcome that is in the 
best interest of the child.80 
Similarly, in Michigan and Alabama, a parent has no authority, merely 
due to their status as the parent, to waive, release, or compromise claims on 
behalf of his or her child.81 The policy in both of these states requires a parent 
to first obtain court approval in order to bind a minor to a settlement 
agreement.82 The goal of this judicial approval requirement is to ensure that 
the minor’s interests are being properly attended to in the settlement 
proceedings.83 
2. New York
New York is an example of a state on the opposite end of the spectrum. 
States like New York favor policies that allow parents or guardians to 
76. Braughton v. Esurance Ins. Co., 466 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2015),
reh’g denied (Apr. 28, 2015). 
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Woodman v. Kera, LLC, 760 N.W.2d 641, 652 (Mich. App. 2008); see also
J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 
2010). 
82. Thode, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
83. Id.
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represent their minor children at settlement hearings without court approval.84 
Further, New York courts cannot amend the terms of a settlement agreement 
consented to by a minor’s parent or guardian on behalf of their child.85 The 
only jurisdictional requirement is that some basis exist to show that the 
settlement is in the best interest of the child.86 This relaxed standard does not 
indicate that New York lacks concern for the interests of children; rather, it 
demonstrates that the New York courts place greater confidence in the 
parents’ knowledge of what is best for their child. 
3. Colorado, Florida, and Other States in the Middle of the Spectrum
In the middle of the policy spectrum are states that neither seek to 
bolster nor to limit a parent’s right to represent their children in settlement 
proceedings. Instead, these states—such as Colorado, Florida, and several 
others—are content with allowing parents, guardians, or the minor’s 
attorney to represent the child in the proceedings.87 However, these states 
also prefer that the courts have enough authority to oversee the entire 
process and to ensure that the minor’s welfare and legal interests are being 
protected throughout the process. 
In Colorado, public policy protects minors from being bound to 
agreements that waive their cause of action for injury-related claims.88 It 
is the policy of each state to impose a duty upon its courts to “exercise a 
watchful and protecting care over a minor’s interests, and not permit his 
rights to be waived, prejudiced or surrendered either by his own acts, or 
by the admissions or pleadings of those who act for him.”89 
Like Colorado, Florida’s policy seeks to further the best interests of 
minors by requiring judicial approval to validate settlements involving 
minors.90 Florida also imposes a monetary requirement in addition to its 
judicial approval requirement,91 prohibiting a minor child’s parents from 
binding the minor to a settlement with a value exceeding $15,000 without 
prior court approval.92 While Florida policy recognizes that parents have 
broad authority over their children, it also asserts that the State has greater 
84. Glenn ex rel. Fraser v. Jones, 796 N.Y.S. 2d 230, 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d. 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2002).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1234–35.
90. Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., 870 So.2d. 20, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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authority as the “parens patriae”93 and thus can deem any contract or 
settlement unenforceable if it runs contrary to public policy.94 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the parens patriae power in 
Prince v. Massachusetts95 when it held that, although there exists a 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions pertaining to the care, 
custody, and control of their minor children, the state, as parens patriae, 
may intervene and require, mandate or regulate whatever is deemed 
necessary to protect the interest of the minor.96 In Cooper v. Aspen Skiing 
Co.,97 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a parental release of a 
child’s cause of action is “not of the same character and quality as those 
rights recognized as implicating parents’ fundamental liberty interest in 
the ‘care, custody and control’ of their children.”98 Significantly, the court 
in Cooper specified that this conclusion was not inconsistent with the due 
process right of parental decision-making recognized in Prince.99 
4. Where Louisiana Falls on the Spectrum
Louisiana’s policy on settlements involving minors falls directly in the 
middle of the spectrum. Similar to most common law states, public policy 
in Louisiana recognizes that a minor should be protected in his or her 
contractual relationships. This notion is expressly stated in Louisiana’s 
Code of Civil Procedure article 4265.100 Article 4265 mandates that a 
competent court approve all settlement agreements concerning minor 
children.101 Like Colorado and Florida, Louisiana’s standard does not 
promote nor limit the rights of parents. Rather, it simply uses the court as 
a check on the parent’s authority.102 
93. Parens Patriae is the Latin translation for “parent of the nation.” This
doctrine allows a state to intervene in any action that violates the health, safety, or 
welfare of its citizenry. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, Class Actions in the 
Gulf South Symposium: State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and 
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000). 
94. Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d. 392, 399 (Fla. 2005).
95. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
96. Shea, 908 So. 2d at 399; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 2054 (2000).
97. 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo.2002).
98. Id. at 1235 n.11.
99. Id. at 400.
 100. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120, 125 (La. 1975); LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. ANN. art. 4265. 
 101. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, Louisiana requires settlements entered into on behalf of a minor to be 
approved by a competent court in the appropriate jurisdiction if the value of the 
settlement is in excess of the allotted amount set forth in the LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:196. 
102. Wilkinson, 323 So.2d at 125. 
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Common and civil law jurisdictions indicate a consensus that the 
overarching goal of any settlement agreement involving a minor is to obtain 
what is in his or her best interests. This assertion strongly suggests that the 
Hallowich agreement is in violation of public policy. Although the settlement 
was approved in accordance with Pennsylvania law, the court failed its duty 
to make sure the agreement was in the best legal interests of the children. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF SETTLEMENTS
INVOLVING MINORS 
Now that the contract law analysis has been explored, it is important to 
address the potential constitutional rights issues involved in the Hallowich 
settlement. Due to the settlement prohibiting the Hallowich children from 
speaking about fracking, the analysis will focus primarily on the right to 
freedom of speech. 
A. State Action Analysis 
Constitutional provisions generally do not apply to the actions of private 
parties.103 Therefore, in order to raise a constitutional rights violation—such 
as a violation of the First Amendment right to Freedom of Speech—there 
must be some state action involved.104 Accordingly, in order to perform a 
proper constitutional rights violation analysis, a state action analysis should 
first be made to determine whether some state action exists.105 
Three paramount cases on the issue of state action are Shelley v. 
Kraemer,106 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company,107 and Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Company.108 Each of these cases is important to a state action 
analysis as they demonstrate different vehicles by which a plaintiff can show 
that state action exists for the purpose of raising a constitutional rights 
violation. Thus, each of these cases will be addressed, analyzed, and 
compared to the facts of the Hallowich case in order to determine if state 
action exists in the enforcement of the Hallowich settlement. 
1. Shelley v. Kraemer
Kraemer involved a suit brought by Louis Kraemer and his wife against 
J.D. Shelley and his wife to enforce restrictive covenants against the 
103. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 620. 
106. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
107. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619. 
108. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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occupancy or ownership of property by African Americans.109 Shelley, an 
African American, argued that the covenant violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.110 The Supreme Court then had to determine whether a 
state action existed in order to address Shelley’s claim.111 The Supreme Court 
opined that a State may act through different agencies—through its legislative, 
executive or judicial authority—and that any action by the State under one of 
their branches constitutes an action of the State.112 The Court concluded that 
the enforcement of property interests by the judiciary would amount to state 
action; thus, this power must be exercised within the boundaries defined by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.113 
Whether Kraemer applies to the Hallowich situation is uncertain. 
Kraemer holds that the enforcement of property interests by the judiciary 
constitutes state action.114 In order to fit the facts of the Hallowich case under 
Kraemer, the argument is that because the settlement agreement called for the 
transfer of the Hallowich property, and a Pennsylvania trial court enforced the 
settlement, that there was an enforcement of property interests by the judicial 
system. With that said, the transfer of the home was not what the court was 
enforcing. Rather, it enforced the confidentiality agreement that was in need 
of approval due to the concern for the minor children. Both of these arguments 
are not without merit, but, it is wise to consider other state action precedent 
before drawing the conclusion whether state action exists in this case under 
the Kraemer standard. 
2. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company,115 also decided by the 
Supreme Court, provides another useful state action analysis. In Edmonson, a 
black construction worker was injured in a job-site accident.116 He 
subsequently sued the concrete company for negligence.117 During voir 
dire,118 the defendant used two of three peremptory challenges to remove 
African Americans from the prospective jury.119 The issue before the Court 
109. Shelly, 334 U.S. at 6. 
110. Id. at 7. 
111. Id. at 13. 
112. Id. at 14. 
113. Id. at 20. 
114. Id. 
115. 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). 
116. Id. at 616. 
117. Id. 
118. The voir dire stage of trial is used as “a preliminary examination of a 
prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and 
suitable to serve on a jury.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
119. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. 
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was whether the defendant’s actions during voir dire amounted to that of 
a state action, which would have allowed for Edmonson to raise an equal 
protection claim.120 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s use of 
peremptory challenges in district court was state action.121 In its reasoning, 
the Court determined that because peremptory challenges are useless 
outside of a courtroom, are regulated by state statute, and are administered 
by judges, their use clearly constitutes state action.122 
On one hand, because the Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding in 
Edmonson is much broader than it was in Kraemer, it is easier to apply 
Edmonson’s state action analysis to Hallowich. In Hallowich, a judge 
approved the settlement agreement between the Hallowich family and the 
defendant oil companies. The judicial act of approval in Hallowich is the 
same state action that the Court in Edmonson sought to include in its 
holding. Although they may intended it, the Supreme Court did not 
specifically state any intent to limit their ruling to peremptory challenges. 
Rather, the Court’s reasoning was founded on the fact that a government 
official, in this instance a judge, was involved in the administering of the 
procedure.123 Therefore, due to the presence of a government official 
administering his approval of the Hallowich settlement under the authority 
of the judicial system of the state, Edmonson applies and the presence of 
a state action exists. 
To further the argument for the existence of state action under 
Edmonson, not only do the judges and courts play a role in approving 
settlements concerning minors, state statutes are what authorize them to 
do so. The state statute, the court, and the judge are all involved in the 
process, quite similar to what was seen in Edmonson. 
The Hallowich settlement ended up in court so that the parties would 
be in compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2039. This 
article is similar to Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure requirement,124 
and requires all settlements involving minors in the state of Pennsylvania 
to be approved in court.125 This rule’s primary purpose is to “prevent 
settlements which are unfair to minors, and to ensure that the minor 
receives the benefit of the money awarded.”126 The enforcement of the 
settlement agreements in accordance with these statutes would clearly fall 
under Edmonson and state action would exist in the Hallowich settlement. 
120. Id. at 620. 
121. Id. at 628. 
122. Id. at 622. 
123. Id. 
124. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4265 (2016). 
125. 231 PA. CODE § 2039. 
126. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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3. Cohen v. Cowles Media Company
A final state action case that is beneficial to examine is Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Company.127 In this Supreme Court case, the plaintiff had provided 
certain information to the defendant’s newspaper company after receiving 
promises of confidentiality from the defendant’s reporters.128 The defendant 
then revealed the plaintiff as the informant, breaching confidentiality.129 The 
plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the newspaper company for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.130 The Supreme Court 
held that the enforcement of the promises made to the plaintiff would violate 
the defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech, since 
compelling the confidentiality agreement would place a limitation on their 
right of speech.131 The Court determined that this was enough to establish state 
action for the purposes of the First Amendment.132 
Cohen provides a strong argument that state action existed in the 
Hallowich case. In both the Hallowich settlement and Cohen, the courts were 
asked to enforce a settlement agreement, which contained confidentiality 
clauses. Because confidentiality clauses restrict speech, they often raise First 
Amendment considerations. The constitutional “violation” at issue in the 
Hallowich settlement is that the Hallowich parents essentially waived their 
children’s First Amendment right of Freedom of Speech in the confidentiality 
agreement. By applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen, state action 
is present and analysis for a violation of the Hallowich children’s First 
Amendment rights should commence. 
B. Waivers of Constitutional Rights in Settlement Agreements 
The law on waivers clearly provides that individuals can decide to 
waive their own constitutional rights, so long as the required factors for an 
enforceable waiver are met.133 The Hallowich parents agreed to waive their 
rights to freedom of speech when they signed the confidentiality clause. 
The problem is that the Hallowich parents also waived their minor 
children’s rights. This issue raises the inquiry of whether a person can 
waive the constitutional rights of another person—particularly a minor. 
127. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
128. Id. at 665. 
129. Id. at 666. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 667. 
133. Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 680 (Conn. 2009). 
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A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege.134 The waiver must be made with the full knowledge of 
the right, along with the awareness of the circumstances and consequences 
of waiving that right.135 Federal law controls the inquiry into whether a 
party has waived a federal provided-for constitutional right.136 
In Perricone v. Perricone, a woman agreed to waive her First 
Amendment right of freedom of speech when she signed a confidentiality 
agreement and promised not to disclose information about her divorce 
from her estranged husband.137 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
a promise to keep information confidential constitutes a valid waiver of 
one’s First Amendment rights.138 Furthermore, Perricone discussed the 
effect of such waivers on public policy. The Court stated that even when 
a waiver of rights is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, public 
policy must also be considered as an additional factor as to whether the 
waiver should be given full effect.139 A waiver may be deemed 
unenforceable if the interests in its enforcement are outweighed by the 
harm done to public policy from the enforcement of the agreement.140 
Generally, situations similar to Perricone—where an individual agrees 
to remain silent and waive his or her First Amendment rights—are quite 
common. This is particularly true in settlement agreements involving oil 
and gas companies.141 The dilemma in Hallowich, however, is 
unprecedented as the parents agreed to waive their children’s rights rather 
than just their own. Despite the absence of law to provide an answer to the 
Hallowich dilemma, a solution can be drawn from analogies to public 
policy and from the laws on waivers. 
Since waivers are required to be made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily, it is highly doubtful that a child could validly waive his or her 
right to free speech. It is unlikely that the Hallowich children, or any child 
in general, would understand what their rights are, much less understand 
the concept of constitutional rights. Even if they did, it is even less likely 
that they would understand the full consequences resulting from such a 
waiver. Stephanie Hallowich, the children’s mother, stated that even she 
did not completely understand the extent to which her children’s rights had 
been surrendered.142 If the children’s mother did not understand the full 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). 
137. Perricone, 972 A.2d at 671. 
138. Id. at 681–83. 
139. Id. at 687 (citing Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1099 
(3d Cir. 1988)). 
140. Id. 
141. Fisher, supra note 15, at 117–20. 
142. Goldenberg, supra, note 4. 
2017] A “MINOR” PROBLEM 227 
extent of the consequences, then it easily follows that the children did not 
understand themselves. 
Moreover, the law on waivers includes public policy as a factor to 
ensure the appropriateness of any waiver agreement.143 As discussed 
previously, the public policy of most states weighs strongly in support of 
the best interests of the children144 by preventing a guardian or parent from 
waiving a minor’s fundamental rights without prior court approval.145 
When the public policy factor favoring the minor’s best interest is figured 
into the waiver enforceability calculation, the scale leans heavily on the 
side of unenforceability. The interests in enforcing the Hallowich 
settlement do not outweigh the harm done to the public policy that exists 
to protect minors from agreements like these. Therefore, if parents cannot 
enter into an agreement to waive a child’s fundamental rights, then parents 
have no authority in the law to waive a child’s constitutional right to 
freedom of speech, because it is a true and fundamental right. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Public policy standards and contract law dictate that the interests of 
minors are of the utmost importance. Therefore, those interests should be 
protected to the full extent of the law. To protect children from being 
harmed in contracts with oil and gas companies, states have required that 
any settlement agreement in which a minor is involved be approved in 
court.146 This alone, however, is not enough to protect the interests of the 
parties on both sides. This judicial requirement was not enough to prevent 
the Hallowich agreement from being enforced, and the Hallowich 
children’s rights were waived as a result. More protection is necessary to 
prevent agreements like the Hallowich settlement from harming minors in 
the future. Also, for oil and gas companies, the issue with these current 
protections afforded to minors is that they limit the amount of protection 
that the drilling companies have in settlements involving minor children. 
Rather than provide the courts with the authority to only approve the 
settlements, courts should be given the authority to determine whether a 
settlement is beneficial to the minor prior to giving its approval. This will 
better serve the interests of the child, while also ensuring that the 
settlement cannot be later invalidated because it was not beneficial to the 
child. This solution will serve both sides equally by protecting the interests 
of both the oil companies and minors. 
 143. Fisher, supra note 15, at 117–20; see also Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 
666, 680 (Conn. 2009). 
144. See supra Part II.D. 
145. Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). 
146. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265; 231 PA. CODE § 2039. 
228 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. V 
This solution can be accomplished by providing trial courts with a 
procedural test to follow before approving any settlement agreement 
involving a minor. The Hallowich Test, an appropriate name for this 
proposal, contains three prongs that must be met in order for the court to 
approve the settlement. The first prong for the court to consider is whether 
the agreement violates the enforcing state’s public policy. If the agreement 
does not violate the state’s policy concerning settlements with minors, then 
the court will proceed to the next analytical prong. The second prong 
places a duty upon the court to examine the enforceability of the 
settlement’s term.147 If the term of the agreement is not enforceable, then 
the analysis stops and the court will not approve the settlement. If the term 
is enforceable, however, the court will proceed to the third and final prong 
of its analysis. This last prong serves as a balancing test to determine the 
proportionality between the rights the minor relinquished and the benefit 
received. Only if the court determines that the damage award is beneficial 
to the minor and is proportionate to what the minor is giving up in the 
agreement, may the court proceed to validate the settlement. 
A. The First Prong: Compliance with Public Policy 
The first prong of the Hallowich Test requires consideration of 
whether the agreement violates the public policy of the state in which the 
agreement is being enforced. In order to define what that state’s public 
policy may be, the court should look to the state’s code of civil procedure 
and the state’s statutes concerning contracts with minors. Once the court 
has defined the relevant state’s policy regarding settlements with minors, 
it must then determine whether the settlement is in compliance with that 
policy. A court does not proceed to the next prong of the analysis if the 
settlement fails this first prong. 
B. The Second Prong: Enforceability of the Settlement’s Term 
The second prong will require the court to decide whether the essential 
term of the settlement is actually enforceable. The court must conclude 
that it is reasonable to expect someone to adhere to the term and that the 
term is legally enforceable. For example, attempting to bind a minor to an 
agreement to never speak about fracking for the rest of his or her life is not 
reasonable, as settlements of a minor’s claim requires court approval and 
court proceedings are a matter of public record.148 Courts should not 
 147. Referring to a provision in a contract that gives rise to a contractual 
obligation, the breach of which can give rise to litigation. 
148. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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approve these types of agreements. If the enforceability requirement is 
satisfied, then the court will proceed to the third and final prong of the 
analysis. 
C. The Third Prong: A Balancing Test 
If the prior two prongs have been met, the court will next have to 
determine whether the value of what the minor is surrendering in the 
agreement is proportional to the benefit that the minor is receiving in 
return. This can be achieved by performing a balancing test. If, like in 
Hallowich the minor is relinquishing a fundamental right only in exchange 
for a small sum of money, the court should not approve the settlement. If, 
however, the court determines that the damage award is beneficial to the 
minor and proportionate to what the minor is giving up, then the court can 
proceed to approve the settlement between the parties. The settlement will 
be binding against both parties and cannot be invalidated. 
Critics of this proposal could argue in support of the free market 
society and suggest that this three-prong test gives courts too much 
authority. This argument will likely be that individuals should have the 
right to agree to whatever they want to in a contract, and not have courts 
disapprove of that right. However, this proposal does not hinder the free 
market society for contracts; rather, it promotes this notion. Giving courts 
more authority in the enforcement of these settlements will provide greater 
security for both sides, and as a result, will provide incentive for both sides 
to come to an agreement with one another, rather than go to trial. 
All parties win with this proposed change in the judicial approval 
requirement, as minors will no longer have their constitutional rights 
waived illegally by their guardians. Further, minor’s overall welfare in 
these agreements will be better protected. As for oil and gas companies, 
they will receive the benefit of having greater security in knowing that 
their settlement agreements will be enforced and not invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
Parents have the right to do many things on their child’s behalf, 
however, agreeing to waive one of their child’s fundamental rights is not 
among them. While the issue presented in Hallowich has remained 
unsolved for several years, this “law school question” has now been 
answered. An analysis of contract law, public policy, and constitutional 
law provides the overwhelming consensus that the interests of minors are 
of the utmost importance, especially in contractual relationships. Thus, an 
agreement not in the best interest of the minor child will not be enforced 
in any court. Hence, one may rest assured in knowing that his or her first 
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amendment right to talk about LSU football cannot be waived by his or 
her parents. 
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